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This  study  identifies  a clear  need  for  government  policy  to address  the  widening  R&D  gap 
between  the  United  States,  Japan  and  Germany.  In  1991,  the  United  States  spent  only  1.9 
percent  of its GDP  on  nondefense  R&D  compared  to 3 percent  for  Japan  and  2.7 percent 
for  Germany.  The  possibility  that  this  gap  can  be closed  through  tax incentives,  such  as 
the  Research  and  Experimentation  tax credit,  appears  highly  unlikely.  A detailed  review  of 
this  credit  shows  that  it had  a relatively  minor  impact  on R&D  spending  since  its inception 
in  1981. 
More  direct  policies  are likely  to be required  if this  gap  is to be narrowed. 
Immediate  gains  can  be made  in the conversion  of military  R&D  expenditures  to address 
other  public  needs.  While  the  federal  government  has reduced  its real  expenditures  for 
military  R&D  since  1987,  the  corresponding  increase  in nondefense  R&D  has  not  kept  up 
with  GDP  growth.  The  failure  to convert  military  to nonmilitary  R&D  will  only  exasperate 
the  current  R&D  gap  and jeopardize  U.S.  shares  of  high  technology  markets. 
Finally  there  is the  question  of how  to improve  the  federal  R&D  program.  In 
particular,  the  congressional  practice  of earmarking  academic  R&D  funds  and  the 
Department  of Defense’s  (DOD)  policy  of reimbursing  independent  R&D,  lack 
accountability.  Furthermore,  nondefense  R&D  projects  should  be administered  by  the 
appropriate  federal  agency  rather  than  by DOD  which  has inherited  several  as a result  of 
economic  conversion.  Finally,  a process  needs  to be established  for  evaluating  the 
effectiveness  of government  R&D  expenditures. The  R&D  Gap 
In 1953,  private industry  in the  United  States  spent  .6 percent  of  gross  domestic 
product  on research  and  development  and  there  was  little  doubt  that  this  would  be sufficient 
to preserve  the  country’s  technological  advantage.  In  1993 private  industry  spent 
considerably  more  on  R&D--  1.3 percent  of GDP--and  yet  there  was  much  wider  concern 
that  this  was  not  enough  for the  United  States  to compete  successfully  in international 
markets.  This  concern  is based  on  comparisons  of U.S.  R&D  spending  with  Germany  and 
Japan. 
It is reassuring,  if only  momentarily,  to note  that  the  U.S.  spends  more  on  total 
R&D  than  Germany,  Japan,  and  France  combined.  Even  as a share  of Gross  Domestic 
Product  (GDP),  the  United  States’  share  (2.6)  does  not  compare  adversely  to that  of Japan 
(3.0),  Germany  (2.8)  or France  (2.4).1  Furthermore,  there  is at least  one  high-technology 
area  in which  the  United  States  enjoys  indisputable  superiority--weapons  production.  This 
distinction  has  been  achieved  only  after  decades  of massive  federal  outlays  for  weapons 
systems  and  R&D.  A comparison  of defense  R&D  relative  to GDP  in Figure  1 shows  that 
United  States  expenditures  have  historically  far exceeded  those  of Japan,  Germany,  and 
France.2 
Figure  1 here. 
The  U.S.  R&D  deficiency,  however,  does  not  concern  national  defense.  It is 
generally  understood  that  if U.S.  firms  are to remain  viable  in today’s  markets  they  must 
have  adequate  investment  in new  technologies  which  in turn  depends  on investments  in 
1 All  references  to Germany  refer  only  to West  Germany.  NSF,  Science  & Engineering 
Indicators--l 993. 
2 Japan’s  expenditures  are less  than  . 1 percent  but  appear  to be zero  in the  figure  due  to 
rounding  error. research  and  development.  The  best  measure  of this  investment  is nondefense  R&D.  In 
1991 Japan  spent  3 percent  of its GDP  on  nondefense  R&D  compared  to 2.7 percent  for 
the former  West  Germany  and  a mere  1.9 percent  for  the United  States.3  There  is a 
possibility  that  even  this  figure  understates  the R&D  gap  because  it only  excludes 
government  funds  for  defense.4 
Not  only  does  the United  States  fall  short  of its two  major  competitors  in this  area, 
but  the  gap  has  been  increasing.  Figure  2 shows  that  in  1970  the  United  States,  Japan  and 
Germany  all spent  approximately  the  same  share  of GDP  on  nondefense  R&D.  Over  the 
past  two  decades  the  share  changed  relatively  little  for  the United  States  but rose 
significantly  for  the  other  two  countries.  The  recent  pattern  also  shows  that  the  United 
States  now  spends  almost  the  same  share  of GDP  on  nondefense  R&D  as France,  placing  it 
far below  Japan  and  Germany. 
Figure  2 here. 
We  may  already  be experiencing  one  of the effects  of this  R&D  gap.  The  United 
States  now  imports  significantly  more  high-technology  commodities  than  it exports.  The 
U.S.  balance  of trade  on  high-technology  exports  has  fallen  steadily  from  a surplus  of  $16 
billion  in  1981  to a deficit  of $47  billion  in  1992.5  This  dismal  performance  would  be even 
worse  if not  for  the  significant  trade  surplus  enjoyed  by the  aircraft  industry,  one  which 
clearly  owes  some  of its superior  performance  to its financial  ties  with  the Department  of 
Defense  (DOD). 
3 Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1993. 
4 Individual  businesses  spend  some  of their  own  funds  on  defense,  often  with  the  intention 
of winning  government  contracts.  Some  portion  of these  expenditures  are currently 
reimbursed  by the Department  of Defense  but  may  not  be designated  as government  R&D 
funds. 
5 High-technology  industries  include  aircraft,  computer  and  office  equipment, 
pharmaceuticals,  communication  equipment,  electrical  machinery,  and  instruments.  NSF, 
Science & Engineering Indicators--l 993: page  440. From  1978  to  1985  there  was  reason  to hope  that  the  U.S.  would  close  the  R&D 
gap  or at least  prevent  it from  widening.  An  upsurge  in real  spending  pushed  private 
industry  R&D  from  1.0 percent  of GDP  in  1978 to  1.4 percent  in  1985.  But,  whatever 
caused  this  boom  appears  to have  run  its course.  Private  industry  expenditures  leveled  off 
after  1985 and  slipped  back  to  1.3 percent  of GDP  by  1993.  The  current  level  and 
composition  of R&D  expenditures  in the United  States  do not  instill  great  confidence  in the 
future  ability  of U.S.  businesses  to compete  successfully  in world  markets. 
While  there  may  be considerable  debate  over  the particular  form  of a national  R&D 
policy,  there  is remarkably  broad  agreement  on  the  need  for one.  It is widely  recognized 
that research  and  development  spending  is discouraged  by the  fact  that  information  and 
know-how  can  easily  slip  into  the  hands  of rivals.  In economic  terms,  new  products, 
techniques  and  discoveries  may  have  a low  level  of  “appropriability.”  A patent  system 
provides  some  protection  but  it is generally  agreed  to be inadequate,  especially  for 
fundamental  discoveries  with  wide-ranging  applications.  If a private  fu-m can’t capture  the 
entire  benefit  from  a particular  expenditure,  in all likelihood,  it will  under  invest  in this 
activity.  This  fact  makes  R&D  a classic  example  of a market  failure,  one  that  demands 
some  form  of government  intervention. 
With  this picture  in mind,  it is clearly  time  to evaluate  the effectiveness  of our 
national  R&D  policy.  Can  a new  R&D  policy  contribute  to closing  the  gap  as it now 
exists?  What  changes  would  have  to be made  in our  current  R&D  policy  to make  it more 
effective?  These  are two  of the  questions  addressed  in this  report. 
R&D  Policy  and  Tax  Incentives 
The  evolution  of R&D  policy  in the United  States  has been  primarily  motivated  by 
issues  of  national  defense,  not  international  trade.  Consequently  a major  focus  of R&D 
spending  in this  country  has  been  on  the production  of  sophisticated  military  equipment  and weapons.  In  1992,  federal  funds  for  defense  R&D  accounted  for  29 percent  of  all R&D 
expenditures  in the  country.  6  More  than  one  out  of every  four  research  dollars  was  spent 
on  defense.  While  this  figure  may  appear  relatively  high,  it was  once  even  higher.  In 
1960,  during  the  middle  of the  cold  war,  one  out  of every  two  research  dollars  was  spent 
on  defense.7 
Other  than  defense,  which  accounted  for  59 percent  of the  federal  government’s 
R&D  budget  in  1992,  several  other  areas  received  smaller  amounts  of public  support 
including  health,  space  research,  energy  and  general  science.  Health  received  $10.1  billion 
in  1992 which  accounted  for  14.7 percent  of the federal  R&D  effort.  Next  in line  were 
space  and  energy  which  accounted  for  an additional  9.9 percent  and  4.5 percent, 
respectively.  General  science  accounted  for  another  3.9 percent.  The  remaining  8.4 
percent  of the  budget  was  spread  out  over  eleven  areas  including  natural  resources  and  the 
environment,  transportation,  agriculture,  and  education.8 
Direct  federal  expenditures  constitute  only  the most  visible  part  of the  national  R&D 
policy.  Less  obvious  is the  fact  that  government  procurment  can  stimulate  industry  R&D. 
This  occurs  when  firms  compete  for valuable  government  contracts  by  spending  their  own 
funds  on research  and  development.  In  some  cases,  firms  may  be reimbursed  for  the 
expense,  often  defined  as Independent Research  and Development  and  Bids and 
Proposals.  In other  cases  firms  may  simply  hope  to recover  the  costs  in the  profits  of 
future  government  contracts.  As Frank  Lichtenberg  concluded  in a detailed  study  of this 
issue,  “government  procurement  as a whole  has  a positive  and  substantial  effect  on  private 
R&D  investment.“9 
In  addition  to direct  expenditures  on R&D  and procurement,  the federal  government 
has attempted  to stimulate  private  sector  expenditures  through  selective  tax incentives.  One 
6 NSF,  Science  & Engineering  Indicators--1993,  page  115. 
7 Statistical Abstract of U.S.,  1993,  pages  598  and  595. 
8 NSF,  Science  & Engineering  Indicators--1993.,  page  363. 
g Lichtenberg  (1988). 6 
of these  is the  full  deduction  permitted  for research  and experimentation  expenditures 
(R&E)  that  dates  back  to the  1954 tax code.  An  alternative  to full  deduction  would  be to 
treat  R&E  like  any other  long  term  investment  and  spread  the  cost  out  for  tax purposes  over 
the estimated  lifetime  of R&E  capital,  an admittedly  intangible  asset.  By  allowing  full 
deduction,  a company  with  current  tax liability  benefits  by not  having  to postpone  (and 
discount)  the  deduction.  lo 
The  primary  focus  of this  report,  however,  is on the  effectiveness  of the  R&E  tax 
credit,  included  in the Economic  Recovery  Act  of  1981.  The  possibility  of increasing  or 
expanding  the  credit  is one  possible  way  of addressing  the  increasing  R&D  gap.  Before 
considering  this  possibility,  however,  it is necessary  to review  the  actual  credit  and  evaluate 
its effectiveness. 
The  R&E  tax credit  originally  allowed  firms  a 25 percent  credit  on  qualified 
increases  above  a calculated  base.  By  confining  the credit  to spending  increases,  the  new 
law  limited  the impact  on  tax revenue  but it also raised  the  difficult  question  of how  to 
measure  a spending  increase.  The  simplest  approach,  comparing  this  year’s  expenditures 
to last  year’s,  was  rejected  because  it could  encourage  perverse  strategies.  For  instance, 
consider  a firm  that  expects  to spend  exactly  the  same  amount  on  R&E  every  year.  If it 
persists  in this policy,  it will  receive  nothing  under  this  simple  tax credit  because  its 
marginal  expenditure  is zero  every  year.  If, however,  it spends  twice  as much  in one  year 
and  nothing  the  next,  it will  average  the  same  expenditure  per  year  but  qualify  for  a much 
higher  credit. 
The  new  law  addressed  this  issue  by calculating  the  base  as an average  R&E 
expenditure  for  the previous  three  years  with  special  provisions  made  for  the  first  two. 1  1 
lo  Leydon  and  Link  (1992),  page  159. 
-3  -2 
11 In effect  the  base  was  equal  to (1/3)X  REi  for  1983,  (1/2)Z  REi  for  1982,  and 
i=-1  i=-1 
(1/2)REi_l  for  1981  since  the  credit  only  applied  to half  the  year.  REi  is research  and 
experimentation  expenditures  in year  i. While  this  approach  tends  to limit  the rewards  for  a one-time  jump  in R&E  spending,  it 
created  other  problems  which  economists  were  quick  to point  out.  An  additional  $1.20 
spent  today  would  be rewarded  by  a 30 cent  credit  this  year  ($1.20  multiplied  by  .25),  but 
it would  also  cause  the  credit  to be reduced  by  10 cents  each  year  for  the  next  three  years  as 
a result  of increasing  the  base.  The  credit  is saved  from  being  a complete  wash  by the  fact 
that  firms  prefer  to have  money  today  rather  than  tomorrow.  The  lower  the  discount  rate, 
however,  the  lower  the  effective  credit.  In the extreme  case  of a discount  rate  equal  to zero, 
the  effective  credit  is zero  as well.  Figure  3 illustrates  the  effective  credit  for various 
discount  rates  calculated  at the pre- 1986 statutory  credit  rate of 25 percent  and  the  post- 
1986 rate  of 20 percent.  12  This  built-in  disincentive  was  quite  clear  to economists; 
whether  it was  as clear  to businesses  is another  matter. 
Figure  3 here. 
The  credit  had  several  other  features.  One  requirement  specified  that  the  base  be at 
least  50 percent  of current  R&E  expenditures.  This  reduced  the  credit  for  firms  with 
especially  fast  growing  research  budgets.  For  any  firm  with  current  expenditures  at least 
twice  the  base,  each  additional  dollar  of R&E  expenditures  automatically  raised  the  base  by 
50 cents,  thus  reducing  the value  of the credit.  This  feature  of the  law  was  made  even  more 
restrictive  in the  1989 reform. 
For  firms  lacking  both  taxable  income  and the  ability  to take  advantage  of the  three 
year  carry  back  provision,  the value  of the credit  is further  diminished.  While  the credit  can 
be carried  forward  up  to  15 years,  the  act of delaying  the  benefit  erodes  its value  due  to 
discounting  and  uncertainty.  The  credit  also  offers  very  little  incentive  for  fnms  which  are 
otherwise  planning  to reduce  R&E  expenditures.  Before  they  can  begin  to take  advantage 
12  The  effective  credit  rate  (k) depends  on  the  stated  credit  rate  (K) and  the discount  rate 
111  11 
according  to the  following  formula:  k =K-K[  L  ~  1  3  (l+r)-l+3  m+T  m of the  credit,  they  must  first  increase  spending  up to the  base  level.  Altogether,  the  net 
effect  of each  of these  qualifications  is to further  reduce  the  effective  credit. 
The  original  credit  was  extended  and modified  with  the  Tax  Reform  Act  of  1986. 
The  most  important  change  in the law  was  to reduce  the  statutory  credit  rate  from  25 
percent  to 20 percent  and  narrow  the  definition  of qualified  research.  On  the  other  hand, 
qualified  expenses  for  basic  research  paid  to colleges  and  other  tax exempt  organizations 
received  a 20 percent  tax credit. l3 
Having  been  extended  several  times,  the tax credit  was  significantly  revised  in 
1989.  In order  to provide  a stronger  incentive,  the  base  calculation  was  changed  from  a 
three-year  moving  average  to one  employing  a fixed  ratio  of R&E  expenditure  to total 
receipts--essentially  the  firm’s  average  during  the  period  1984 to  1988.14  The  new  base 
calculation  eliminated  the penalty  which,  economists  had  pointed  out,  diminished  the 
incentive  for  a firm  to increase  R&D.  Businesses  could  now  increase  their  R&D  expenses 
without  fear  that  future  credits  would  be reduced.  As  long  as firms  maintained  a ratio  of 
R&D  to sales  above  their  1984 to  1988 average,  they  would  be likely  to qualify  for  the 
credit.  Depending  on the  discount  rate,  this  change  has  the  effect  of greatly  increasing  the 
pecuniary  incentive  for  R&D  spending.  l5 
The  new  law  also phased  in a progressively  higher  base  limitation  which  reduces 
the reward  to exceptional  growth  in R&E.  In the  original  law,  only  50 cents  of  a dollar 
spent  on R&E  qualified  for the  credit  once  total  expenditures  exceeded  200 percent  of the 
base.  By  1995,  only  25 cents  of  an additional  dollar  would  qualify  for  the  credit  once 
l3  Internal  Revenue  Service,  Corporate  Returns,  1986, page  100.  Revenue  Reconciliation 
Act  of 1989,  Senate  Committee  on  Finance,  1Olst  Congress,  Oct.  12,1989,  GPO,  page 
39. 
l4  The  fixed  ratio  is equal  to the  frrrn’s historical  ratio  of R&D  expenditures  to sales  from 
1984 to  1988.  The  base  is then  calculated  as the product  of this  ratio  and  average  receipts 
over  the  four  preceding  years.  The  ratio  was  set at 3 percent  for  start-up  companies  and 
special  provisions  were  made  to develop  a fixed  ratio  for  these  firms  and  those  without 
sufficient  records  of R&E  expenses  or receipts  in the  1980s. 
l5  For  example,  assuming  a discount  rate  of  10 percent,  the  effective  credit  on  an 
additional  dollar  of R&D  spending  increases  from  3.4 percent  to 20 percent.  This  is 
approximately  a six-fold  increase  in the  effective  credit. 9 
expenditures  exceeded  125 percent  of  base. 16  It is this  form  of the  law  that  was  renewed 
by the  Budget  Reconciliation  Act  of  1993 and  extended  to June  30,199K17  The  new  law 
greatly  increased  the R&D  incentive  by eliminating  the rolling  base  but  at the  same  time 
reduced  the relative  incentive  for very  large  increases  in R&D. 
U.S.  Industry  R&D:  The  Historical  Record 
At  least  since  1953, R&D  expenditures  by private  industry  have  risen  faster  than 
both  the  underlying  inflation  rate  and  gross  domestic  product.  As  a result,  real  industry 
R&D  and  industry  R&D  shares  of GDP  have  increased  as shown  in Figures  4 and  5.  In 
1953,  industry  R&D  was  only  .6 percent  of GDP  compared  to  1.4 percent  in  1985.  Figure 
5, however,  reveals  more  than  a simple  upward  trend.  After  remaining  relatively  constant 
over  the  197Os, R&D  shares  rose  quite  rapidly  between  1978  and  1985.  During  this  brief 
period,  R&D  boomed  in the  U.S.,  coinciding  with  a similar  expansion  in Japan  and 
Germany.  But  spending  in U.S.  industry  peaked  in  1985  and  began  to drift  downward, 
still remaining  above  the  1970s  level. 
Figures  4 and  5 here. 
Any  national  R&D  policy  should  be based  on  a solid  understanding  of what 
determines  industry  R&D--one  that  can  account  for the  1978 to  1985 expansion.  There 
are, as is often  the  case  in economics,  a number  of competing  explanations.  The  first  is the 
already-mentioned  investment  tax credit  which  took  effect  in June  1981.  Furthermore,  one 
16 Where  the base  was required  to be at least  50 percent  of current  qualified  R&E 
expenditures  up  to  1990,  the  minimum  was  gradually  raised  to 75 percent  by  1995. 
Revenue Reconciliation  Act of 1989, Committee  on  Finance,  1989. 
l7  “Summary  of the Revenue  Provisions  of  the Omnibus  Budget  Reconciliation  Act  of 
a&%tion~‘dolfar  of  R&l_) spe%img~mcrea^s^es’ti%m  3.4 peiceiii  to ‘zu p%%&.“ffiis’is 
approximately  a six-fold  increase  in the  effective  credit. 10 
could  claim  that  the  end  of the  boom  in  1986 was  related  to tax reform  which  reduced  the 
size of the credit  and  at the  same  time  tightened  the criteria  for qualified  research. 
There  are also  grounds  for  skepticism.  It appears  from  the  graph  that  the  beginning 
of the  R&D  expansion  can  be placed  at  1978 or  1979,  at least  two  years  before  the  tax 
credit  was passed.  The  credit  was  evidently  not  the  only  factor  in the  R&D  increase.  It 
would  also  be surprising  if the relatively  small  changes  made  to the law  in  1986 could 
abruptly  alter  the pattern  of R&D  spending.  The  credit  was  only  reduced  from  25 to 20 
percent  and  was  extended  to cover  funding  for university  basic  research. 
Timing  is one  problem  with  the  credit  explanation,  magnitude  is the  other.  The 
R&D  expansion  in the early  1980s is simply  much  bigger  than  what  could  have  been 
expected  from  the credit  alone.  For  example,  suppose  we  attributed  the  entire  increase  in 
industry  R&D  shares  from  1980 to  1985 to the  tax credit.  Could  the  credit  have  caused  a 
25.8  percent  increase  in annual  R&D  spending. 718  The  problem  is that  this  figure  is about 
twice  the  size  of even  the  most  optimistic  estimate  of  the credit’s  impact.  In  summary,  the 
credit  appeared  to be too  late,  persisted  too  long,  and  was  too  small  to account  for  the  R&D 
boom  of the  early  1980s.  This  is not  the  same  as saying  that  the  credit  had  no effect  but 
only  that  other  factors  are clearly  important. 
An  alternative  explanation  is foreign  competition.  Firms  can  respond  to foreign 
competition  in a number  of different  ways;  they  can  simply  concede  market  share;  they  can 
cut prices;  or they  can  increase  expenditures  on  advertising  and  R&D  in an effort  to attract 
customers.  An  increase  in foreign  competition  in many  areas  of the  U.S.  economy  could 
be one  of the  factors  behind  the R&D  boom.  One  indicator  of the  intensity  of foreign 
competition  is the  level  of U.S.  nonpetroleum  imports.  Figure  6 shows  the  relationship 
l8  This  is based  on  a change  in the  R&D  share  of GDP  of  .29 percentage  points  from  1980 
to  1985.  This  ratio  multiplied  by  1980 GDP  ($2,708  billion)  and  divided  by total  industry 
R&D  spending  in  1980  ($30.9  billion)  yields  the  25.8  percent  increase.  If we  assume  that 
the effective  credit  was  approximately  5 percent,  the implied  long  run  elasticity  with  respect 
to R&D  prices  is 5.2 percent,  far greater  than  the range  of 2 to 2.7 estimated  by Hall 
(1993). 11 
between  nonpetroleum  import  intensity  and  industry  R&D  shares.  Import  intensity  rose 
quite  rapidly  during  two  periods:  1975  to  1980 and  1982  to  1988.  Except  for  a brief  lapse 
related  to the  twin  recessions  of  1980 and  1982,  the rapid  influx  of imports  from  1975  to 
1988 parallels  the R&D  boom  from  1978  to  1985.  There  is a possibility  that  at least  part  of 
the  R&D  boom  was  related  to increased  foreign  competition. 
Figure  6 here. 
Another  possible  explanation  is related  to military  procurement.  The  Department  of 
Defense  will  typically  solicit  proposals  for  the design  of a new  weapons  system  from 
private  businesses.  These  “design  competitions”  require  extensive  preparation  and  R&D 
on  the part  of participants  who  are willing  to incur  such  expenses  because  they  hope  to be 
selected  as the primary  contractor.  Although  fms  may  later  be reimbursed  for  these 
expenditures,  they  are still  typically  reported  as industry  R&D.  This  means  that  these 
expenditures  are included  in the  R&D  boom  from  1978 to  1985. 
There  was in fact  a similar  expansion  in military  purchases  during  this period. 
DOD  procurement  rose  from  approximately  1.0 percent  of GDP  in  1977  to  1.8 percent  in 
1986  as illustrated  in Figure  7.  The  slide  in procurement  after  1986 corresponds  closely 
with  a similar  pattern  in industry  R&D.  There  is also  the  fact  that  the  military  expansion  in 
the  1980s  included  many  high  technology  weapons  systems  such  as AWACs,  Stealth 
Bombers,  and  Star  Wars.  l9 
l9  If rising  DOD  procurement  in the early  1980s  stimulated  private  R&D,  why  didn’t 
falling  DOD  procurement  during  the  1950s  and  1960s cause  the reverse  to occur?  During 
this  time,  the  United  States  was  simultaneously  demobilizing  from  the  Korean  War  and 
W.W.II  and  mobilizing  for  the  cold  war.  It is quite  possible  that  although  DOD 
procurement  was  being  cut  at this  time,  a greater  emphasis  was  being  placed  on 
sophisticated  weapons  systems  produced  by private  industry.  Some  of  the  early  reduction 
in procurement  was  related  to the  shift  from  personnel  to weapons  systems.  There  were  in 
fact  nearly  one  million  fewer  military  employees  in  1975 than  in  1955.  Statistical Abstract 
of the United States,  1979, page  353. 12 
Figure  7 
Another  event  which  could  have  affected  R&D  spending  in some  industries  was  the 
energy  crisis.  Rising  energy  prices  in the  1970s  eventually  motivated  many  firms  to 
improve  their  energy  efficiency  which  required  the  development  and  installation  of new 
equipment  and  production  methods.  Figure  8 shows  the  historic  pattern  in energy  prices 
relative  to industry  R&D  shares. 20  There  is little  indication  that  industry  R&D  responded 
to the  initial  energy  crisis  in  1974 but the  R&D  boom  does  correspond  with  the  second 
upswing  in energy  prices  in  1979.  Energy  prices  began  to  subside  in  1981, preceding  a 
similar  change  in R&D  by four  years.  One  could  construe  from  this  graph  that  R&D 
spending  did  respond  to the  energy  crisis  but only  with  a significant  lag. 
Figure  8 here. 
We  are left  with  the problem  of determining  which  of the  above  reasons  are 
primarily  responsible  for  the  R&D  boom  in the early  1980s.  If it was  the  credit,  then  we 
have  identified  an effective  policy  tool  for  stimulating  industry  R&D.  If it was  military 
procurement,  then  we have  identified  another  government  action  that  can  affect  private 
R&D.  If it was  foreign  competition  or rising  energy  prices,  then  we  must  take  these  into 
account  in our  national  R&D  policy.  The  investigation  of this  question  involved  three 
different  types  of  statistical  studies  described  below.  Each  was  designed  to investigate 
some  particular  aspect  of this  problem. 
Time-Series  Evidence 
20 Energy  prices  are represented  by the ratio  of the  producer  price  index  for  fuels,  power, 
and  related  products  to the  overall  producer  price  index. 13 
How  much  did  the  R&E  tax credit,  imports,  defense  spending,  and  energy  prices 
contribute  to the industry  R&D  boom?  One  way  to estimate  these  contributions  is by 
estimating  a time-series  model  which  analyses  the  movement  of industry  R&D  intensity 
over  time.  This  type  of  study  was  conducted  using  data  from  1953 to  1992  and  described 
in full  detail  in the Appendix.  R&D  intensity  is expected  to be a function  of the  R&E  credit 
(identified  by the  years  the  credit  was  in place),  import  intensity  (U.S.  nonpetroleum 
imports  divided  by GDP),  defense  procurement  (again  divided  by GDP)  and  relative 
energy  prices. 
The  results  show  that  the  complete  model  explains  approximately  95 percent  of the 
variation  in R&D  intensity.  For  the entire  period,  only  the  credit  and  imports  appeared  to 
have  a significantly  positive  effect  on industry  R&D  as a share  of GDP.  During  the  more 
recent  period,  from  1970 to  1992,  both  these  variables  were  again  statistically  significant  as 
were  defense  spending  and  energy  prices. 
It is instructive  to look  at the estimated  impact  of the  R&E  credit.  According  to the 
full  model,  the ratio  of industry  R&D  to GDP  was  .12  percentage  points  higher  during  the 
period  covered  by the  credit.  In  1980,  this  would  have  translated  into  a 10.5 percent 
increase  in  R&D  spending.21  This  is a large  gain  assuming  the  effective  credit  was  no 
more  than  5 percent,  but  still  within  the range  of earlier  studies.  There  is a problem, 
however.  The  high  correlation  between  the  credit  and  other  variables  makes  it difficult  to 
have  much  confidence  in these  estimates.  The  correlation  between  the credit  variable  and 
imports  is especially  high  at .82 and  still relatively  high  for defense  procurements  and 
energy  prices  (.54 for both).  In  such  a situation  it is admittedly  difficult  to accurately  sort 
out  the  individual  contribution  of each  variable. 
2l  Multiplying  .0012  by  1980 GDP  ($2,708  billion)  and  dividing  this  by industry  R&D 
spending  in  1980  ($30.9  billion)  yields  10.5 percent.  Assuming  a 5 percent  effective 
credit,  the  elasticity  estimated  in this  test  is 2.1,  which  falls  within  Hall’s estimated  range  of 
2.0  to  2.7. 14 
Industry  Evidence 
One  of the  major  drawbacks  of a simple  time-series  test is that  it fails  to consider  the 
variation  within  industries.  This  is particularly  important  here  because  R&D  intensity 
varies  so widely  among  industries  as does  DOD  procurement  and  imports.  The  top  five 
R&D  spending  industries  are for  office,  computing,  and  accounting  machines;  motor 
vehicles  and  equipment;  aircraft  and missiles;  communication  equipment;  and  drugs.22 
Together,  these  five  industries  accounted  for  52 percent  of all industry  R&D  but  only  19 
percent  of  sales  in manufacturing  in  1989.  DOD  procurement  is even  more  unevenly 
distributed  with  the  top  two  industries,  aircraft  and  missiles;  and  communication  equipment 
receiving  approximately  69 percent  of all orders  in  1987.23  If the  hypothesis  in this  report 
is correct  then  one  would  expect  to find  the largest  increases  in R&D  spending  in those 
industries  with  the  largest  increases  in DOD  procurement  and  foreign  imports. 
Regression  analysis,  described  in more  detail  in the Appendix,  shows  that  this  is in 
fact  the  case.  This  test  is based  on  a sample  of 25 industries  covering  all of manufacturing 
from  1969  to  1989.  R&D  intensity,  defense  procurement,  and  imports  are  all divided  by 
industry  shipments  rather  than  GDP,  but  otherwise  the  tests  are ~imi1a.r.~~ In this  study, 
R&D  intensity  was  consistently  higher  in those  industries  with  high  ratios  of imports  and 
DOD  procurement  to shipments.  There  was,  however,  no compelling  evidence  that R&D 
was  significantly  higher  during  the  years  when  the  R&E  tax credit  was  in place.  For  all 
industries,  the model  explained  99 percent  of the variation  in R&D  intensity  over  this 
twenty-one  year  period. 
Separate  tests  were  undertaken  to investigate  the role  of these  variables  in specific 
industries  with  relatively  high  R&D  expenditures  (greater  than  1 percent  of industry 
22 NSF,  “Research  and  Development  in Industry,  1990.” 
23 U.S.  Dept.  of  Commerce,  “Shipments  to Federal  Government  Agencies,  1987.” 
24 The  energy  price  variable  was  also  omitted  since  it was  not  particularly  important  in the 
time-series  data  and  there  is no  cross-sectional  dimension  to it. 15 
shipments).  In these  separate  regressions,  imports  had  a positive  and  significant  effect  in  6 
industries  (including  motor  vehicles),  DOD  procurement  had  a positive  and  significant 
effect  in 5 industries  (including  aircraft  and  missiles),  and  the  R&E  credit  had  a significant 
and positive  effect  in only  one  industry.  But  even  this  single  positive  result  is questionable 
because  R&D  spending  in this  industry,  aircraft  and  missiles,  is so heavily  dependent  on 
defense  orders. 
The  results  of the  industry  analysis  appears  to support  the view  that  military 
procurement  and  imports  are largely  responsible  for  the  R&D  boom  in the  early  1980s. 
The  role  of the  R&E  credit  remains  in doubt.  Relative  to these  other  factors,  it does  not 
appear  to have  had  a particularly  significant  effect  on  industry  R&D  spending. 
Company  Evidence 
One  specific  concern  about  the R&E  credit  is that  the beginning  of the  R&D  boom 
actually  preceded  the implementation  of the tax credit  by approximately  three  years.  The 
question  has  been  raised  as to whether  the increase  in R&D  intensity  following  the passage 
of the credit  was  in fact  any  larger  than  the  increase  that preceded  it25  In order  to answer 
this  question,  I collected  a sample  of 221  firms  from  Compustat  database  with  R&D 
spending  greater  than  $25  million  from  1978 to  1985-&e  duration  of the  R&D  boom. 
One  of the  advantages  of company  data  that  has been  exploited  by other  researchers 
is the  detailed  information  about  financial  positions  of fmns.26  It is possible  in these 
datasets  to distinguish  between  those  firms  which  are most  likely  to benefit  from  the  credit, 
and  those  which  are not.  In particular,  firms  with  a history  of net  losses  are  less  likely  to 
be able  to use  the credit  immediately,  especially  if they  have  no  current  or past  tax liability. 
25 Mansfield  (1984). 
26 See  for  example  Hall  (1993)  and  Swenson  (1992). 16 
I used  the  company  data  set to test  whether  R&D  spending  was  any  larger  after  the  credit 
and  more  specifically,  if it was  larger  for  those  firms  with  the  most  to gain  from  the  credit. 
The  results  of this  exercise  are described  in the Appendix.  The  hypothesis  is that 
certain  factors  contributed  to an underlying  increase  in R&D  intensity  from  1978 to  1985 
which  then  experienced  an acceleration  from  1981 to  1985 under  the  R&E  credit.  The 
nature  of  this  hypothesis  is illustrated  in Figure  9.  There  is an underlying  growth  rate  in 
R&D  intensity  represented  by  slope  a which  then  increases  by an amount  equivalent  to b 
due  to the  credit.27  The  analysis  in the  Appendix  provides  estimates  of b which,  to the 
extent  that  the R&E  credit  was  effective,  would  be expected  to be positive  and  statistically 
significant. 
Figure  9 here. 
Estimates  of b using  the entire  sample  are positive  but not  statistically  significant.  It 
does  not  appear,  at least  for this  sample,  that  R&D  spending  significantly  accelerated  after 
1980 due  to the  R&E  credit.  Additional  tests  were  conducted  to exclude  those  firms  with 
the least  likelihood  of qualifying  for the  credit  due  to a lack  of tax liability.  In one  test, 
firms  were  excluded  from  estimates  of b if they  had  losses  in the  current  year.  In  another, 
firms  were  excluded  if their  accumulated  net income  in the current  and previous  three  years 
was  negative.  Each  of these  tests  allows  for  the fact  that  the firms  most  likely  to take 
advantage  of the  credit  are those  with  current  or past  tax liability.  In every  one  of  these 
tests,  estimates  of  b decreased  rather  than  increased.  Consequently,  the  firms  that  had  the 
greatest  potential  for  benefiting  from  the  R&E  credit  did  not  appear  to significantly 
accelerate  their  R&E  spending  after  1980 relative  to the  average  firm. 
27 The  model  is a spline  function  of the form:  R&D/Sales=ag+aYt+b(Yt-Yc)Ct+e.  In this 
model,  R&D  intensity  is a function  of time  (Yt).  The  variable  Ct is equal  to one  when  the 
credit  was  in force  (1981  and  on)  and  Yc is equal  to  1980.  R&D  intensity  increases  at the 
rate  of a per  year  until  198 1 when  it accelerates  (or decelerates)  by an amount  proportional 
to  b. 17 
The  results  of this  research  and  those  of others  suggests  several  tentative 
conclusions.2*  While  part  of the period  associated  with  the  R&D  boom  overlaps  the  R&E 
credit,  the  actual  relationship  is far more  complicated.  It would  be difficult  to conclude  that 
the  R&E  tax credit  had  a large  positive  effect  on industry  R&D.  The  R&D  boom  began 
two  to three  years  before  the  credit  was  passed  and ended  while  the  credit  was  still  in place. 
Alternatively,  this  analysis  suggests  that  the  industry  R&D  boom  was  linked  to a rapid 
expansion  in imports  and  defense  spending  and  to a lesser  extent,  energy  prices. 
Some  analysts  suggested  from  the  start that  the reason  the  R&E  credit  was  not 
likely  to have  a large  effect  was  because  of the disincentives  built  into  the rolling  base.  The 
effective  subsidy  for  any  increase  in R&D  spending  was  greatly  reduced  by including  it in 
calculations  of future  spending  thresholds.  What  begins  as an official  20 to 25 percent 
credit  may  shrink  to a 3 to 5 percent  effective  credit  depending  on  the discount  rate  and 
other  qualifications. 
If the  credit  failed  to have  a more  prominent  impact  because  of this penalty,  why 
didn’t R&D  pick  up  after  the penalty  was  eliminated  in the  1989 reform?  Industry  R&D 
has remained  a relatively  stable  1.3 percent  of GDP  since  1989,  slightly  below  its  1985 
level.  In most  economic  models,  the  switch  to a fixed  ratio  in the  credit  calculation  should 
have  greatly  magnified  the  incentive  to invest.  One possible  conclusion  from  all this  is that 
the  credit  is not  especially  important  in determining  R&D  spending.  Another  possibility  is 
that  the  added  incentive  of eliminating  the rolling  base  was exactly  offset  by tightening  the 
base  limitation.  Recall  that  the  1989 tax bill limited  the full value  of the credit  to 
expenditures  exceeding  the  base  by 25 percent  or less.  Beyond  25 percent  the  credit  was 
reduced  by a factor  of four.  How  many  firms  this  might  have  affected  is not  at all clear. 
Even  if the R&E  credit  did  stimulate  additional  R&D,  it has been  questioned 
whether  the  additional  spending  was  as large  as the  tax revenue  foregone.  Edwin 
Mansfield  concluded  in his early  study  that  “the extra  R&D  stimulated  by the  tax credit 
28 Mansfield  (1986,1984)  and  Eisner  (1985,  1984) 18 
seems  to have  been  considerably  less  than  the revenue  lost  to the  Treasury.“29  The  size  of 
the  allowable  R&E  credit  is reported  in Table  1 for  198 1 to  1991. 
Table  1 here. 
Mansfield  was  also  one  of the first  to point  out  that  the  tax credit  created  an 
incentive  for firms  to redefine  related  activities  as research  and  experimentation  so that  they 
could  qualify  for  a larger  credit.  He concluded  that  a considerable  amount  of the  initial 
increases  in R&E  spending  was  caused  by this  slight  of  hand  rather  than  real  spending 
increases. 
National  R&D  Policy 
This  report  began  by identifying  a large  and  growing  gap  between  nondefense  R&D 
spending  in the  U.S.  and  that  of Japan  and  Germany.  If the  United  States  is to look 
forward  to a future  which  includes  a solid  share  of the  world’s  high  technology  markets,  it 
must  close  this  gap.  Jnternational  competition  will,  in  all likelihood,  stimulate  industry 
R&D  but there  is probably  little  hope  of  actually  closing  the gap  without  a reorientation  of 
U.S.  R&D  policy.  To  this  end  the  government  must  introduce  policies  which  either 
stimulate  private  industry  expenditures  or expand  government  funded  R&D.  How  can 
public  policy  be reoriented  to address  these  challenges? 
While  private  industry  in the United  States  provides  46.9  percent  of total  R&D 
funds,  the  comparable  shares  are 59.9  percent  for  Germany  and  72.7  percent  for  Japan.3o 
There  is obviously  room  for U.S.  firms  to increase  their  share  of  the  nation’s  R&D  effort. 
But  other  than  the  R&E  credit,  there  are few  public  policies  which  are even  intended  to 
29 Mansfield  (1984). 
30 NSF,  Science  & Engineering Indicators--1993,  page  377 and  378. 19 
encourage  more  industry  R&D.  Given  the research  in this  report,  it is difficult  to believe 
that  a stronger  credit  would  do  much  good.  The  best  argument  one  could  make  in its favor, 
however,  is that  the  credit  would  have  had  a positive  effect  after  1989 if not  for  the  higher 
base  limitation.  If the  experiment  with  the  credit  is to be continued,  an obvious 
improvement  would  be to reverse  the  base  limitation  introduced  in the  1989 tax bill. 
Instead  of reducing  the  effective  credit  for R&D  spending  exceeding  25 percent  of the  base, 
the  credit  would  be increased.31 
If this  change  is to make  any  difference,  it must  be demonstrated  that  substantial 
numbers  of firms  are likely  to increase  R&D  spending  by 25 percent  or more.  The 
evidence  for  the  1978-1985  period  suggests  that  this  number  is not  insignificant.  In fact, 
approximately  40 percent  of all R&D  increases  during  this  time  originated  in firms  with 
individual  increases  of 25 percent  or more. 32  It would  appear  that  a significant  number  of 
firms  could  potentially  benefit  from  removing  the  base  limitation  penalty. 
Before  pursing  this  policy,  at least  two  objections  must  be overcome.  First,  any 
expansion  of the  R&E  credit  is likely  to entail  lost revenue,  a problem  that  was  not 
addressed  in the  original  legislation  creating  the credit.  In fact,  one  could  claim  that  the 
R&E  credit  was  initially  unfunded,  contributing  to larger  federal  budget  deficits.33  In 
today’s  environment  it is more  difficult  to justify  expanding  the  R&E  credit,  or even 
keeping  it, if it means  higher  deficits  or fewer  public  goods. 
This  raises  the  important  question  of who  should  pay  for the  credit.  Recall  that  its 
purpose  is to remedy  a market  failure,  the chronic  under  investment  in R&D  due  to 
3l  A very  similar  problem  existed  with  the old  utility  price  structure  called  declining block 
rates.  With  lower  prices  at higher  levels  of consumption,  this  policy  encouraged 
consumption  rather  than  conservation.  Modern  price  structures  are more  likely  to contain 
increasing block rates which  encourage  conservation. 
32 This  is based  on  a sample  averaging  525  firms  from  1978  to  1985.  In this  sample,  60 
percent  of all increases  in R&D  were  from  firms  with  0 to 25 percent  R&D  growth  rates, 
37 percent  for  fums  with  25 to  100 percent  growth  rates,  and  3 percent  for  firms  with  more 
than  100 percent  growth  rates.  Source:  Compustat. 
33 The  discussion  here  treats  the  tax credit  as a microeconomic  policy  intended  to correct  a 
market  failure.  If the purpose  is to stimulate  the  macroeconomy  through  deficit  spending 
then  the  issue  of  funding  is irrelevant. 20 
uncertainty  and  lack  of appropriability.  In theory,  firms  do not  invest  sufficiently  in R&D 
because  much  of the  benefit  will  be captured  by other  firms.  To  the  extent  that  the  credit 
precipitates  some  fms  to increase  their  R&D  funding,  others  will  benefit  without  paying  a 
cent.  Ideally  one  would  want  those  corporations  benefiting  as free  riders  to pay  the  cost  of 
providing  the  incentive.  While  it is probably  impossible  to target  specific  free  riders  for  tax 
purposes,  it would  not  be inappropriate  to finance  the  R&E  credit  with  a slightly  higher 
corporate  profit  tax.  This  would  provide  funds  to finance  the  current  R&E  credit  as well  as 
any  expansion  in the  credit. 
The  second  objection  to strengthening  the R&E  credit  is more  fundamental--it  may 
not  work.  The  results  of my  research  provide  few  reasons  to be optimistic.  It is hard  to 
imagine  that  any  change  in the  credit  would  spark  enough  industry  R&D  to actually  close 
the  gap. 
There  is another  way  that  the  government  can  and  does  stimulate  industry  R&D. 
An  important  lesson  of this  analysis  is that  government  procurement  can  stimulate  private 
expenditures.34  Up  until  now  this  has  been  proven  primarily  through  military 
procurement,  which  accounted  for  87.3 percent  of all manufacturing  sales  to the  federal 
government.  Other  federal  agencies  are relatively  small  consumers  of industrial  goods.  In 
1987,  NASA  was  responsible  for  2.8 percent  of all federal  government  orders  from 
manufacturing,  DOE’s  share  was  1.1 percent,  and  all other  federal  agencies  together 
amounted  to an 8.8 percent  share. 35  There  is currently  no  other  federal  agency  that 
compares  with  DOD  in its capacity  to issue  large  contracts  for  high  technology  products. 
34 As  Lichtenberg  (1988)  has  demonstrated,  this  arises  primarily  through  design  and 
technical  competitions  in which  firms  compete  with  each  other  for  the purpose  of winning 
production  contracts.  His  results,  however,  apply  only  to competitive  contracts. 
Noncompetitive  contracts,  often  issued  as a follow-on  to existing  contracts,  actually  had  the 
opposite  effect--reducing  industry  R&D.  Since  competitive  procurement  had  a relatively 
stronger  impact,  the overall  effect  of government  procurement  on R&D  remained  positive. 
35 U.S.  Department  of Commerce,  “Manufacturer’s  Shipments  to the  Federal 
Government,  1987.” 21 
As  defense  priorities  subside,  there  is a growing  need  for  public  goods  in other 
areas,  such  as transportation,  energy,  education,  environmental  protection,  and  health  care. 
At least  some  consideration  should  be given  to expanding  the procurement  capacity  of other 
agencies  for  high  technology  projects.  It is conceivable  that  an expansion  of  government 
procurement  awarded  on  the  basis  of design  competition  could  stimulate  considerable 
private  R&D  in each  of these  nondefense  areas. 
The  possibilities  in these  areas  are limited  by funding,  not  lack  of good  ideas.  The 
Department  of Education  may  find  it useful  to purchase  high  resolution  television  monitors 
or computers  for  schools,  the National  Institute  of Health  may  wish  to purchase  equipment 
for medical  research,  the Department  of Energy  may  attempt  to develop  solar  cells  and 
storage  batteries  for  government  buildings,  or the Department  of Transportation  may  want 
to assist  in the  development  of  modern  commuter  systems.  These  purchases  would  not 
only  contribute  to improving  the  quality  of public  goods  but  could  replace  the  impetus  for 
industrial  R&D  once  provided  by DOD.  These  technological  alternatives  should  be given 
serious  consideration  as replacements  for  canceled  weapons  systems  . 
Even  with  an increase  in industry  R&D,  there  is probably  little  hope  of closing  the 
gap  without  an increase  in direct  government  expenditures  on  nondefense  R&D.  One  part 
of this reorientation  is already  underway,  the  conversion  of military  research  to other 
purposes.  Some  programs,  such  as the  Technology  Reinvestment  Project  (TRP),  provide 
funds  for  expanding  the  competitiveness  of defense-dependent  industries  and  supporting 
“dual-use”  technologies,  those  benefiting  both  defense  and  nondefense  interests.36  There 
are also  the  “cross-cutting”  R&D  initiatives  which  bring  several  federal  agencies  together  to 
coordinate  broad  areas  of research  under  the Federal  Coordinating  Council  for  Science, 
Engineering,  and  Technology  (FCCSET).37 
36 NSF,  Science  & Engineering  Indicators--1993,  page  115. 
37 NSF,  Science  & Engineering  Indicators--1993,  page  108. 22 
The  primary  problem  with  recent  conversion  efforts  are that  they  have  been 
relatively  small.  Figure  10 shows  recent  trends  in federal  contributions  to R&D  for  defense 
and  nondefense  purposes.  Relative  to GDP,  R&D  for  defense  has  clearly  declined  since 
1987 but  without  a corresponding  increase  in nondefense  shares.  If conversion  efforts  are 
to contribute  to the  national  R&D  effort,  federal  R&D  for  nondefense  must  grow  much 
faster. 
Figure  10 here. 
A  second  problem  with  recent  conversion  efforts  is that  several  new  R&D  projects 
have  been  retained  by DOD  even  though  they  may  have  little  to do  with  defense.  While  the 
Department’s  spending  on military  R&D  has  subsided  in recent  years,  civilian  research  has 
grown  rapidly,  reaching  $1.9  billion  in  1993.  Many  of  these  projects,  which  focus  on 
health,  energy,  transportation,  or manufacturing  would  be better  placed  in the  appropriate 
federal  agency  such  as the  National  Institutes  of Health,  the Department  of Energy, 
Transportation,  or Commerce.  Included  in this  list is $100  million  for  Sematech,  the  much 
discussed  research  joint  venture  between  private  businesses  and DOD.  But  this  was  only 
one  of 35 different  projects  identified  by the  G.A.O.  which  range  from  medical  research  on 
AIDS  and  breast  cancer  ($57 million  and  $210  million  respectively)  to the  national  aero- 
space  plane  technology  program  ($14 1 million).38 
Some  projects  will  undoubtedly  require  a coordinated  effort  among  several 
agencies,  requiring  a “cross-cut”  initiative,  but  too  often  these  merely  serve  to preserve 
DOD’s  dominant  role.  An  advantage  of involving  more  government  agencies  in this 
process  is to foster  competition  for public  funds.  Each  agency  would  be compelled  to 
38 U.S.  General  Accounting  Office,  “DOD  Budget:  Department  of Defense  Support  for 
Domestic  Civil  Activities.” 23 
demonstrate  valuable  and  constructive  results  in order  to vie  with  other  agencies  for 
congressional  funding. 
Conversion  will  require  more  than  simply  replacing  one  type  of R&D  with  another. 
Important  issues  will  have  to be addressed  concerning  where  federal  R&D  efforts  will  be 
directed,  how  they  will  be administered,  and  which  agency  will  be the  funding  source. 
Several  principles,  however,  should  be useful  in guiding  the  expansion  of nondefense 
R&D.  First,  Congress  should  continue  to determine  the  functional  distribution  of research 
funds.  The  decision  of how  much  money  to place  in health  research  versus  computer  chip 
technologies  for  example  must  be based  on  open  public  discussions.  This  also  means  that 
Congress  should  not  be involved  in specific  allocation  of research  money.  Recent 
objections  have  focused  on the congressional  practice  of earmarking  academic  research 
projects  for particular  districts.  While  these  funds  remain  a relatively  small  part  of the 
overall  federal  research  effort,  it has  grown  rapidly  in recent  years.  Academic  R&D  funds 
earmarked  by  Congress  rose  from  $247  million  in  1990,  to $470  million  in  1991  and  $707 
million  in  1992.39  It is difficult  to defend  the  merit  of R&D  dollars  that  are granted 
through  any  process  other  than  design  competitions  or some  form  of competitive  peer 
review. 
Equally  difficult  to defend  is the  current  government  policy  of reimbursing  firms  for 
independent  R&D,  conducted  primarily  by defense  contractors.  In the  modem  era,  it 
makes  little  sense  for the  government  to underwrite  R&D  that it played  no role  in 
developing  nor  enjoys  any  control  over.  In testimony  before  the  Senate  Armed  Services 
Committee  and  Joint  Economic  Committee  in  1975, Admiral  H.G.  Rickover  concluded 
that  “The current  IR&D  [Independent  R&D]  program  does  not  provide  benefits  to the 
Government  anywhere  near  the cost. “40  His  proposal  to eliminate  the practice  remains 
39  NSF,  Science  & Engineering  Indicators--1993,  page  139. 
40 Statement  before  the  Senate  Armed  Services  Committee  and The  Joint  Economic 
Committee,  September  29,1975. 24 
equally  appropriate  today.  Independent  R&D  reimbursement,  which  costs  the  federal 
government  more  than  $2 billion  a year,  should  be discontinued.41 
Not  only  is it important  that  the process  for distributing  R&D  dollars  be defensible 
but there  must  be an impartial  assessment  of the  effectiveness  of particular  lines  of 
research.  It is much  easier  to distribute  funds  for R&D  than  to demonstrate  that  they  are 
being  well-spent.  For  this  purpose,  it would  be necessary  to establish  a review  process 
that  would  do more  than  determine  whether  the  funds  were  spent  legally.  A professional 
review  should  also  be able  to determine  whether  the research  produced  any  valuable 
discoveries  or innovations.  This  type  of evaluation,  which  is occasionally  conducted  by 
the  General  Accounting  Office,  should  be incorporated  as an integral  part  of the  federal 
R&D  effort. 
Finally  it should  be noted  that  government  agencies  have  all experimented  with 
different  types  of methods  for  funding  R&D.  In  some  cases,  grants  are issued  to 
individual  academic  researchers  to conduct  specific  experiments  or research  while  in others, 
the  government  has  embarked  on joint  efforts  with  private  businesses,  requiring  specified 
levels  of  spending  or performance  by private  firms.  Up  to this  point,  no particular  method 
has proven  superior  to any  other  in producing  socially  useful  innovations.  It is conceivable 
that  a better  system  of assessing  the results  of federally  funded  research  would  shed  more 
light  on  the  effectiveness  of these  various  alternatives. 
41 NSF,  Science  & Engineering  Indicators--1993,  page  360. 25 
Appendix  A:  Accounting  for  the  Industry  R&D  Boom:  1978-1985 
Why  did  industry  R&D  increase  so rapidly  from  1978 to  1985  and  how  much  did 
the  R&E  tax credit  have  to do  with  it?  These  are the questions  addressed  in this  Appendix 
which  utilizes  a number  of different  statistical  tests.  The  first  one  is a time-series  analysis 
which  attempts  to model  changes  in industry  R&D  as a share  of GDP  from  1953 to  1992. 
It is expected  that  this  variable  is determined  by the level  of international  competition,  the 
level  of defense  procurement,  energy  prices,  and  the  R&E  credit. 
Time-Series 
International  competition  is measured  by the ratio  of U.S.  nonpetroleum  imports 
divided  by GDP. 42  The  annual  level  of procurement  for the  Department  of Defense  was 
also  divided  by GDP  to represent  changes  in intensity  over time.43  Energy  prices  were 
equal  to the  ratio  of the producer  price  index  for  fuels,  related  products  and  power  to total 
producer  price  index. 44  The  variable  for the R&E  credit  was  equal  to one  in the  years  that 
the  credit  applied,  1981  and  thereafter.  Finally,  industry  R&D  was  equal  to the  annual 
funds  provided  by industry  for  R&D,  again  divided  by GDP.45 
The  results  of ordinary  least  squares  regressions  for  the  entire  period,  1953  to 
1992,  are reported  in Table  2.  Because  of the presence  of  strong  serial  correlation,  each  of 
the  estimates  include  corrections  for  autocorrelation.  In the  first  regression,  the  credit 
variable  is not  statistically  significant.  In the  second  regression,  column  2, both  the  credit 
and import  variable  are statistically  significant,  the former  at the  5 percent  level  and  the 
42 Economic Report  of the President,  February  1994. 
43 Statistical Abstract of the United States, various years. 
d4 Economic  Report  of the President,  February  1994,  p.  344. 
45 NSF,  Science & Engineering Indicators--I993,  page  333 and Statistical Abstract of the 
United States, various years. 26 
latter  at the  1 percent  level.  Coefficients  on the  defense  variable  and  energy  prices  are not 
statistically  significant. 
Table  2 here. 
The  results  are different,  however,  when  the  time  frame  is limited  to the more  recent 
1970  to  1992 period.  The  credit  variable  is now  highly  significant  whether  it is included 
alone  in column  3 or with  additional  explanatory  variables  as in column  4.  The  magnitude 
of the variable  also  increases  in the  full  model,  indicating  that  the  industry  R&D  ratio  to 
GDP  is .12  percentage  points  higher  during  the  period  of the  credit.  In this  specification, 
import  intensity  and  defense  orders  are also  highly  significant,  both  at the  1 percent  level. 
The  implication  is that  higher  imports  or defense  purchases  tend  to increase  the  level  of 
industry  R&D.  Energy  prices  are also  significant  in this  model,  at the  5 percent  level, 
suggesting  higher  R&D  during  the  energy  crisis. 
Why  was  defense  spending  highly  significant  in the recent  period  but  not  the  longer 
period  dating  back  to  1953?  Going  back  to the earlier  period,  defense  procurement 
experienced  a major  reduction  following  W.W.11 and  the  Korean  War.  Much  of this 
reduction  was  related  to the  demobilization  of a very  large  standing  army,  one  that  was 
gradually  replaced  by more  sophisticated  weapons  systems  including  nuclear  missiles.  The 
initial  decline  in DOD  procurement  probably  coincided  with  an increase  in high  technology 
procurement  and  would  not  have  had  a depressing  effect  on industry  R&D.  On the  other 
hand,  much  of the  military  buildup  in the  1980s  was  focused  specifically  on  high 
technology  areas  including  the  Strategic  Defense  Initiative.  Within  this  context  it is not 
surprising  that  an expansion  of DOD  procurement  could  stimulate  industry  R&D  in the 
1980s  but  a decrease  in procurement  in the  1950s  and  1960s  would  have  no  equivalent 
impact. 27 
The  results  of this  test  suggest  that  the credit  did  have  a positive  and  significant 
effect  on  industry  R&D  spending.  There  are, however,  grounds  to be  skeptical.  The 
problem  is that  several  of the  explanatory  variables  are highly  correlated,  even  in the period 
from  1970  to  1992.  The  correlation  between  defense  spending,  energy  prices  and  R&D 
spending  is high  but it is especially  high  between  imports  and  R&D  spending  with  a 
correlation  coefficient  equal  to .82.  The  close  correspondence  between  imports  and  the 
R&E  credit  makes  it particularly  difficult  to determine  the  independent  contribution  of each 
variable. 
Industry  Study 
Another  approach  to this  question  is to study  changes  in R&D  spending  in specific 
industries.  For  this  purpose,  data  were  collected  for  twenty-five  industries  from  1969 to 
1989.  Sources  of the  data  are reported  in Table  3.  Industry  categories  were  based  on  those 
of the  National  Science  Foundation  contained  in their  reports  on  industry  R&D  spending. 
Although  these  industries  cover  all of manufacturing  they  represent  an amalgam  of two  and 
three  digit  industries  based  on  the  Standard  Industrial  Classification. 
Table  3 here. 
Other  data,  for  defense  spending  and  imports,  were  aggregated  from  the  three  digit 
level  to the  NSF  industry  code.  Significant  revisions  were  made  in the  Standard  Industrial 
Classification  in  1987, requiring  some  adjustment  for  later  years.  Fortunately  the  Census 
of Manufactures  reported  DOD  Shipments  from  manufacturing  in  1987 in both  the  new  and 
old  classification  system,  making  it possible  to adjust  post-1986  data.  Furthermore,  the 
Department  of Commerce  did  not report  DOD  shipments  for  specific  industries  after  1987 
nor  for  the  years  1985 and  1986.  The  defense  data  for these  years  were  estimated  by 28 
interpolation  using  known  estimates  of total DOD  procurement  in each  year.46  R&D  data 
were  also  missing  for  some  industries,  especially  during  the  earlier  years  of the  period. 
These  were  also  estimated  by means  of interpolation.47 
Estimates  of this  model  for  all twenty-five  industries  from  1969 to  1989  are 
presented  in Table  4.  The  estimates  are from  ordinary  least  squares,  corrected  for 
autocorrelation.  The  full  model,  including  each  variable,  is presented  in Column  1.  It 
shows  that  both  imports  and  defense  spending  appear  to have  a positive  effect  on industry 
R&D  spending  and  are highly  significant  (at the  1 percent  level).  The  credit  variable, 
identical  to the  one  used  in the  time-series  study,  is positive  but not  statistically  significant. 
In other  regressions,  omitting  various  variables,  the  credit  coefficient  remains  largely 
unchanged  and  insignificant.  According  to this  test,  it does  not  appear  that  the  credit  had  a 
strong  effect  on  industry  R&D  spending. 
Table  4 here. 
An  alternative  to testing  the effect  of these  variables  for  all industries  is to test  them 
individually  for each  industry.  These  tests  were  conducted  for  each  industry  with  a ratio  of 
R&D  to shipments  greater  than  or equal  to  1 percent.  The  results,  reported  in Table  5, 
indicate  that  imports  were  apparently  important  in some  industries  while  defense 
procurement  was  important  in others.  In only  one  industry,  aircraft  and  missiles,  did  the 
credit  appear  to have  a positive  and  significant  effect.  The  results  for  this  industry  are 
obviously  going  to be influenced  by the  fact  that  it is the  largest  defense  manufacturer.  In 
1987,  this  single  industry  accounted  for 44 percent  of all shipments  to the  federal 
government.  The  possibility  of distinguishing  between  the  effect  of the  credit  and  defense 
procurement  is probably  least  likely  for  this  industry. 
46 Annual  DOD  procurement  was  based  on the figure  reported  in the StutisticaZ  Abstract of 
the United States,  1991, No. 542. 
47 In this  case,  interpolation  was  based  on  the  industry’s  share  of R&D  spending. 29 
Table  5 here. 
Another  question  which  can  be addressed  using  statistical  analysis  is whether  or not 
the  R&D  boom  accelerated  after  1980 when  the  R&E  credit  was  introduced.  This  question 
can  be explored  using  company  data  obtained  from  the  database,  Compustat.  With  these 
data., it is possible  to identify  particular  companies  which  are most  likely  to benefit  from  the 
R&E  credit.  Specifically,  firms  with  positive  net  income  or positive  net  income  over  the 
past  three  years  are likely  to benefit  the  most  from  the  R&E  credit.  Unfortunately,  data  that 
describe  the  level  of import  competition  or the magnitude  of defense  procurement  are 
typically  lacking  at the company  level,  making  it difficult  to test a complete  model  of R&D 
behavior. 
In order  to test the possibility  that the  credit  caused  the R&D  boom  to accelerate,  a 
model  was  estimated  using  a spline  function.  In this  specification  the  credit  variable 
essentially  measures  the change  in R&D  growth  after  1980.4g  The  model  was  tested  for  a 
sample  of  221  firms  from  1978 to  1985 with  R&D  spending  of  $25  million  or more. 
The  results  of this regression,  again  corrected  for  autocorrelation  and  including 
company  dummy  variables,  are presented  in Table  6.  Results  in the  first  column  simply 
confirm  that  R&D  intensity  increased  significantly  during  this period.  The  results  in the 
second  column  show  that  R&D  spending  did  accelerate  after  1980 but that  the  magnitude  of 
the  acceleration  was  not  significant  at the 5 percent  level.  This  is indicated  by the positive 
coefficient  (.091)  on  the  credit  variable.  The  second  two  regressions  experimented  with 
different  specifications  for  the credit  variable.  In column  3, the  acceleration  was  tested  only 
for fums  with  current  positive  net  income  and  in column  4, the effect  was  limited  to firms 
48 This  is based  on  a spline  function  described  in footnote  35. 30 
with  positive  net  income  over  the  past  three  years49  By  imposing  these  conditions,  the 
effect  of the  credit  is measured  only  for those  fiis  with  the  strongest  potential  for 
benefiting  from  it.  The  result,  is rather  surprising  since  the  coefficients  on  the  revised 
credit  variables  are negative  and even  statistically  significant.  One  interpretation  is that 
fums  with  negative  net income  also  experienced  declining  sales.  If these  firms  did  not 
reduce  their  R&D  spending  proportionately  with  sales,  their  R&D  intensity  would  have 
increased.  Once  these  firms  are accounted  for,  R&D  shows  no  sign  of  accelerating  under 
the  credit. 
These  results  indicate  that  any  acceleration  in R&D  spending  after  1980 was  most 
likely  to occur  among  those  firms  with  the  least potential  for benefiting  from  the  credit--the 
ones  with  negative  net  income.  There  is little  support  here  for believing  that  the  R&E  credit 
made  much  of a contribution  to the  R&D  boom  from  1978 to  1985. 
49 In column  4 for example,  the  credit  variable  is equal  to one  only  if the  year  is  198 1 or 
later  and  the  sum  of current  net profits  and  that  of the previous  three  years  are greater  than 
zero. 31 
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Sources:  Same as Figure 4 and Statistical  Abstract  of the  U.S., various  years. Figure  8 
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Research  and Experimentation  Credit: 



























Source: Corporation Income Tax Returns, Internal  Revenue  Service  (IRS) 
and  unpublished  IRS  data. Table  2 
Regressions  on  R&D  Intensity 
Annual  Data 
Independent  Variable:  Industry  R&D/GDP 
Independent 
Variable 
1953-1992  1970-1992 
1  2  3  4  z 
cmlit  .062  .066*  .32”*  .12** 
(.048)  (.053)  (.03)  (.04) 
Imports/Shipments  5.42””  5.12** 
(1.56)  (.92) 
Defense/Shipments  -1.72  10.77”” 
(2.55)  (2.89) 
Energy  Prices  .18  .141” 
(.15)  (.08 1) 
Constant  .99**  .59**  1.02**  .46** 
(-13)  (15)  (.02)  (. 10) 
Adjusted  R2  .95  .95  .90  .95 
Durbin-Watson  1.15  1.40  1.88  2.08 
Note:  Standard  errors  are in parentheses.  All  estimates  are multiplied  by  100. 
* Significantly  different  from  zero  at the 5 percent  level. 
** Significantly  different  from  zero  at the  1 percent  level. Table  3 




Mean  De  ‘ation  Description 
.028  .O%  Ratio  of company  funds  spent  on industrial  R&D 
to industry  shipments.  Source:  NSF,  “Research 
and  Development  in  Industry,”  1989,1979. 
Missing  observations  (primarily  in the  early 
years)  were  estimated  by interpolation. 
Imports/Shipments  .112  .151  Ratio  of imports  for  consumption  to industry 
shipments.  Source:  U.S.  Dept.  of  Commerce, 
Trade  & EmpZoyment and  “U.S.  Imports  of 
Merchandise  for  Consumption  and  General 
Imports  of Merchandise.” 
Defense/Shipments  .059  .130  Industry  shipments  to the  U.S.  Dept.  of Defense 
divided  by total  industry  shipments.  Source: 
U.S.  Dept.  of  Commerce,  “Shipments  to Federal 
Government  Agencies,”  and  “Manufacturer’s 
Shipments  to the  Federal  Government.”  Missing 
observations  were  estimated  using  defense 
procurement  to estimate  annual  levels  of Dept.  of 
Defense  shipments  and  then  interpolated  to 
determine  individual  industry  shipments. 
credit 
Shipments 
.429  .495  Variable  equal  to  1 when  R&E  tax credit  was  in 
place,  equal  to 0 otherwise. 
Total  industry  shipments.  Source:  U.S.  Dept.  of 
Commerce,  “Shipments  to Federal  Government 
Agencies,”  and  “Annual  Survey  of 
Manufacturers.” Table  4 
Regressions  on  R&D  Intensity 
All  Industries,  1969- 1989 
Independent 
Variable 
Independent  Variable:  R&D/Shipments 
1  2  3  4 
Imports/Shipments  .016**  .016** 
(.005)  (.005) 
Defense/Shipments  .039””  .039** 
(.009)  (.009) 
credit  .0009  .OOll  .0006  .0012 
(.OOOS)  (.OOOS)  (.OOOS)  (.OOOS) 
Industry  Variables  X  X  X  X 
Adjusted  R2  .99  .99  .99  .99 
Durbin-Watson  1.62  1.64  1.80  1.46 
Note:  Standard  errors  are in parentheses. 
* Significantly  different  from  zero  at the  5 percent  level. 
** Significantly  different  from  zero  at the  1 percent  level. Table  5 
Regressions  on  R&D  Intensity 
Descriptive  Results  for  Specific  Industries 
1969-1989 
Industries  for  which  imports 
had  a significant  positive  effect  on  R&D  intensity. 
Standard 
Mean  Industrial 
R&D/Shipments  Classification 
Drugs  and  other  Medicines 
Other  Chemicals 
Office,  Computing  and Accounting  Machines 
Electronic  Components 
Motor  Vehicles  and Equipment 
Optical,  Surgical,  Photographic,  and  other  Instruments 
.094  283 
.015  284,285,  287-89 
.132  357 
.044  367 
.03 1  371 
.059  383-87 
Industries  for  which  defense  spending 
had  a significant  positive  effect  on R&D  intensity. 
Rubber  Products 
Other  Machinery,  except  Electrical 
Electrical  Components 
Aircraft  and Missiles 
Scientific  and Mechanical  Measuring  Equipment 
.OlO  300 
.013  35 l-56,  358,359 
.044  367 
.052  372,  376 
.05 1  381,382 
Industries  for  which  the  R&E  tax credit 
had  a significant  positive  effect  on R&D  intensity. 
Aircraft  and Missiles  .052  372,  376 
Other  industries  with  high  R&D  intensity. 
(R&D/shipments  greater  than  .Ol) 
Industrial  Chemicals  .029  281-82,  286 
Petroleum  Refining  .012  290 
Stone,  Clay  and  Glass  Products  .OlO  320 
Radio  and TV  Receiving  Equipment  .018  365 
Communication  Equipment  ,079  366 
Other  Electrical  Equipment  .021  361-64,  369 Table  6 
Regressions  on R&D  Intensity 
Company  Data:  1978-1985 
Independent  Variable:  Company  R&D/Sales 
Independent 
Variable  1  2  3  4 




.190**  .119**  .296**  .196** 









Company  Dummy  Var.  X  X  X  X 
Adjusted  R2  .94  -94  .94  .94 
>  D  r  in-W  n  1.95  1.94 
Note:  Standard  errors  are in parentheses.  All  estimates  are multiplied  by  100. 
* Significantly  different  from  zero  at the  5 percent  level. 
** Significantly  different  from  zero  at the  1 percent  level. 